Abstract. We introduce the concept of concurrent signatures. These allow two entities to produce two signatures in such a way that, from the point of view of any third party, both signatures are ambiguous with respect to the identity of the signing party until an extra piece of information (the keystone) is released by one of the parties. Upon release of the keystone, both signatures become binding to their true signers concurrently. Concurrent signatures fall just short of providing a full solution to the problem of fair exchange of signatures, but we discuss some applications in which concurrent signatures suffice. Concurrent signatures are highly efficient and require neither a trusted arbitrator nor a high degree of interaction between parties. We provide a model of security for concurrent signatures, and a concrete scheme which we prove secure in the random oracle model under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Introduction
The problem of fair exchange of signatures is a fundamental and well-studied problem in cryptography, with potential application in a wide range of scenarios in which the parties involved are mutually distrustful. Ideally, we would like the exchange of signatures to be done in a fair way, so that by engaging in a protocol, either each party obtains the other's signature, or neither party does. It should not be possible for one party to terminate the protocol at some stage leaving the other party committed when they themselves are not.
The literature contains essentially two different approaches to solving the problem of fair exchange of signatures.
Early work on solving the problem was based on the idea of timed release or timed fair exchange of signatures [BN00, EGL85, G83] . Here, the two parties sign their respective messages and exchange their signatures "little-by-little" using a protocol. Typically, such protocols are highly interactive with many message flows. Moreover, one party, say B, may often be at an advantage in that he sometimes has (at least) one more bit of A's signature than she has of B's. This may not be a significant issue if the computing power of the two parties are roughly equivalent. But if B has superior computing resources, this may put him at a significant advantage since he may terminate the protocol early and use his resources to compute the remainder of A's signature, while it may be infeasible for A to do the same. Even if the fairness of such protocols could be guaranteed, they may still be too interactive for many applications. See [GP03] for further details and references for such protocols.
An alternative approach to solving the problem of fair exchange of signatures involves the use of a (semi-trusted) third party or arbitrator T who can be called upon to handle disputes between signers. The idea is that A registers her public key with T in a one-time registration, and thereafter may perform many fair exchanges with other entities. To take part in a fair exchange with B, A creates a partial signature which she sends to B. Entity B can be convinced that the partial signature is valid (perhaps via a protocol interaction with A) and that T can extract a full, binding signature from the partial signature. However, the partial signature on its own is not binding for A. B then fulfils his commitment by sending A his signature, and if valid, A releases the full version of her signature to B. The protocol is fair since if B does not sign, then A's partial signature is worthless to B, and if B does sign but A refuses to release her full signature then B can obtain it from T . The third party is only required in case of dispute; for this reason, protocols of this type are commonly referred to as optimistic fair exchange protocols. See [ASW98,ASW00,BGLS03,BW00,CS03,DR03,GJM99,PCS03] for further details of such schemes.
The main problem with such an approach is the requirement for a disputeresolving third party with functions beyond those required of a normal Certification Authority. In general, appropriate third parties may not be available.
It is our thesis that the full power of fair exchange is not necessary in many application scenarios. This paper introduces a somewhat weaker concept, which we name concurrent signatures. The cost of concurrent signatures is that they do not provide the full security guarantees of a fair exchange protocol. Their benefit is that they have none of the disadvantages of previous solutions: they do not require a special trusted third party 3 , and they do not rely on a computational balance between the parties. Moreover, our concrete realization is computationally and bandwidth efficient. Informally, concurrent signatures appear to be as close to fair exchange as it's possible to get whilst staying truly practical and not relying on special third parties.
Our Contributions
We introduce the notion of concurrent signatures and concurrent signature protocols. In a concurrent signature protocol, two parties A and B interact without the help of a third party to sign (possibly identical) messages M A and M B in such a way that both A and B become publicly committed to their respective messages at the same moment in time (i.e. concurrently). This moment is determined by one of the parties through the release of an extra piece of information k which we call a keystone. Before the keystone's release, neither party is publicly committed through their signatures, while after this point, both are. In fact, from a third party's point of view, before the keystone is released, both parties could have produced both signatures, so the signatures are completely ambiguous.
Note that the party who controls the keystone k has a degree of extra power: it controls the timing of the keystone release and indeed whether the keystone is released at all. Upon receipt of B's signature σ B , A might privately show σ B and k to a third party C and gain some advantage from doing so. This is the main feature that distinguishes concurrent signatures from fair exchange schemes. In a fair exchange scheme, each signer A should either have recourse to a third party to release the other party B's signature or be assured that the B cannot compute A's signature significantly more easily than A can compute B's. With concurrent signatures, only when A releases the keystone do both signatures become simultaneously binding, and there is no guarantee that A will do so. However, in the real world, there are often existing mechanisms that can naturally be used to guarantee that B will receive the keystone should his signature be used. These existing mechanisms can provide a more natural dispute resolution process than reliance on a special trusted party. We argue that concurrent signatures are suited to any fair exchange application where:
-There is no sense in A withholding the keystone because she needs it to obtain a service from B. For example, suppose B sells computers. A signs a payment instruction to pay B the price of a computer, and B signs that he authorizes her to pick one up from the depot (B's signature may be thought of as a receipt). Then A can withhold the keystone, but as soon as she tries to pick up her computer, B will ask for a copy of his signature authorizing her to collect one. In this way B can obtain the keystone which validates A's payment signature. In this example, the application itself forces the delivery of the keystone to B. -There is no possibility of A keeping B's signature private in the long term.
For example, consider the routine "four corner" credit card payment model. Here C may be A's acquiring bank, and B's signature may represent a payment to A that A must channel via C to obtain payment. Bank C would then communicate with B's issuing bank D to obtain payment against B's signature and D could ensure that B's signature, complete with keystone, reaches B (perhaps via a credit card statement). As soon as B has the keystone, A becomes bound to her signature. In this application, the back-end banking system provides a mechanism by which keystones would reach B if A were to withhold them. -There is a single third party C who verifies both A and B's signature. Now, if
A tries to present B's signature along with k to C whilst withholding k from B, B will be able to present A's signature to C and have it verified. As an application, consider the (perhaps somewhat artificial) scenario where A and B are two politicians from different parties who want to form a coalition to jointly release a piece of information to the press C in such a way that neither of them is identified as being the sole signatory to the release. Concurrent signatures seem just right for this task. Here the keystone is not necessarily returned to B, but it does reach the third party to whom B wishes to show A's signature.
We also consider an example where concurrent signatures provide a novel solution to an old problem: that of fair tendering of contracts (our signatures can also be used in a similar way in auction applications). Suppose that A has a bridge-building contract that she wishes to put out to tender, and suppose companies B and C wish to put in proposals to win the contract and build the bridge. This process is sometimes open to abuse by A since she can privately show B's signed proposal to C to enable C to better the proposal. Using concurrent signatures, B would sign his proposal to build the bridge for an amount X, but keep the keystone private. If A wishes to accept the proposal, she returns a payment instruction to pay B amount X. She knows that if B attempts to collect the payment, then A will obtain the keystone through the banking system. But A may also wish to examine C's proposal before deciding which to accept. However there is no advantage for A to show B's signature to C since at this point B's signature is ambiguous and so C will not be convinced of anything at all by seeing it. We see that the tendering process is immune to abuse by A. We note that this example makes use of the ambiguity of our signatures prior to the keystone release, and although the solution can be realized by using standard fair exchange protocols, such protocols do not appear to previously have been suggested for this purpose.
Our schemes are not abuse-free in the sense of [BW00, GJM99] , since the party A who holds the keystone can always determine whether to complete or abort the exchange of signatures, and can demonstrate this by showing an outside party C the signature from B with the keystone before revealing the keystone to B. However the above example shows that abuse can be addressed by our schemes in certain applications.
Technical Approach
We briefly explain how a concurrent signature protocol can be built using the ambiguity property enjoyed by ring signatures [RST01, AOS02] and designated verifier signatures [JSI96] . This introduces the key technical idea of our paper.
A two-party ring signature has the property that it could have been produced by either of the two parties. A similar property is shared by designated verifier signatures. We will refer to any signature scheme with this property as an ambiguous signature scheme and we will formalize the notion of ambiguity for signatures in the sequel. Since either of two parties could have produced such an ambiguous signature, both parties can deny having produced it. However, we note that if A creates an ambiguous signature which only either A or B could have created, and sends this to B, then B is convinced of the authorship of the signature (since he knows that he did not create it himself). However B cannot prove this to a third party. The same situation applies when the roles of A and B are reversed.
Suppose now that the ambiguous signature scheme has the property that, when A computes an ambiguous signature, she must choose some random bits h B to combine with B's public key, but that the signing process is otherwise deterministic. Likewise, suppose the same is true for B with random bits h A (when the roles of A and B are interchanged). Suppose A creates an ambiguous signature σ A on M A using bits h B that are derived by applying a hash function to a string k that is secret to A; h B is then a commitment to k. B can verify that A created the signature σ A but not demonstrate this to a third party. Now B can create an ambiguous signature σ B on M B using as its input h A the same h B that A used. Again, A can verify that B is the signer. As long as k remains secret, neither party can demonstrate authorship to a third party.
But now if A publishes the keystone k, then any third party can be convinced of the authorship of both signatures. The reason for this is that the only way that B could produce σ B is by following his signing algorithm, choosing randomness h A and deterministically producing σ B . The existence of a pre-image k of B's randomness h A determines B as being the only party who could have conducted the signature generation process to produce σ B . The same holds true for A and σ A . Thus the pairs k, σ A and k, σ B amount to a simultaneously binding pair of signatures on A and B's messages. We call these pairs concurrent signatures.
We point out that Rivest et al. in their pioneering work on ring signatures [RST01] considered the situation in which an anonymous signer A wants to have the option of later proving his authorship of a ring signature. Their solution was to choose the bits h B pseudo-randomly and later to reveal the seed used to generate h B . In this work, we use the same trick for a new purpose: to ensure that either both or neither of the parties can be identified as signers of messages.
We note that any suitably ambiguous signature scheme can be used to produce a concurrent signature protocol. We choose to base our concrete scheme on the non-separable ring signature scheme of [AOS02] . This scheme is, in turn, an adaptation of the Schnorr signature scheme. A second concrete scheme can be built from the short ring signature scheme of [BGLS03] using our ideas. An earlier version of our scheme used the designated verifier signatures of [JSI96] instead, however it achieved slightly weaker ambiguity properties than our concrete scheme.
We give generic definitions of concurrent signatures and concurrent signature protocols, a suitably powerful multi-party adversarial model for this setting, and give a formal definition of what it means for such schemes and protocols to be secure. Security is defined via the notions of unforgeability, ambiguity and fairness.
Because our concrete scheme is ultimately based on the Schnorr signature scheme [S91] , we are able to directly relate its security to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in an appropriate group. In doing this, we make use of the forking lemma methodology of [PS96, PS00] ; for this reason, our security proof will be in the random oracle model.
Formal Definitions

Concurrent Signature Algorithms
We now give a more formal definition of a concurrent signature scheme. Our protocols are naturally multi-party ones, so our model assumes a system with a number of different participants that is polynomial in the security parameter l. Definition 1. A concurrent signature scheme is a digital signature scheme comprised of the following algorithms:
SETUP: A probabilistic algorithm that on input a security parameter l, outputs descriptions of: the set of participants U, the message space M, the signature space S, the keystone space K, the keystone fix space F, and a function KGEN : K → F. The algorithm also outputs the public keys {X i } of all the participants, each participant retaining their private key x i , and any additional system parameters π. ASIGN: A probabilistic algorithm that on inputs X i , X j , x i , h 2 , M , where h 2 ∈ F, X i and X j = X i are public keys, x i is the private key corresponding to X i , and M ∈ M, outputs an ambiguous signature σ = s, h 1 , h 2 on M , where s ∈ S, h 1 , h 2 ∈ F. AVERIFY: An algorithm which takes as input S = σ, X i , X j , M , where σ = s, h 1 , h 2 , s ∈ S, h 1 , h 2 ∈ F, X i and X j are public keys, and M ∈ M, outputs accept or reject. We also require that if σ = s, h 2 , h 1 , then AVERIFY(σ , X j , X i , M ) = AVERIFY(σ, X i , X j , M ). We call this the symmetry property of AVERIFY. VERIFY: An algorithm which takes as input k, S where k ∈ K is a keystone and S is of the form S = σ, X i , X j , M , where σ = s, h 1 , h 2 with s ∈ S, h 1 , h 2 ∈ F, X i and X j are public keys, and M ∈ M. The algorithm checks if KGEN(k)= h 2 . If not, it terminates with output reject. Otherwise it runs AVERIFY(S) (in which case the output of VERIFY is just that of AVERIFY).
We call a signature σ an ambiguous signature and any pair k, σ , where k is a valid keystone for σ, a concurrent signature. The obvious correctness properties for ambiguous and concurrent signatures are formalized in Section 3.
Concurrent Signature Protocol
We will describe a concurrent signature protocol between two parties A and B (or Alice and Bob). Since one party needs to create the keystone and send the first ambiguous signature, we call this party the initial signer. A party who responds to this initial signature by creating another ambiguous signature with the same keystone fix we call a matching signer. Without loss of generality, we assume A to be the initial signer, and B the matching signer. From here on, we will use subscripts A and B to indicate initial signer A and matching signer B. The signature protocol works as follows:
A and B run SETUP to determine the public parameters of the scheme. We assume that A's public and private keys are X A and x A , and B's public and private keys are X B and x B .
1: A picks a random keystone k ∈ K, and computes f = KGEN(k). A takes her own public key X A and B's public key X B and picks a message M A ∈ M to sign. A then computes her ambiguous signature to be
and sends this to B. Note that inputs k, S A and k, S B will now both be accepted by VERIFY, where S A = s A , h A , f , X A , X B , M A and S B = s B , h B , f , X B , X A , M B .
Formal Security Model
We present a formal security model for concurrent signatures in this section.
Correctness
We give a formal definition of correctness for a concurrent signature scheme.
Definition 2. We say that a concurrent signature scheme is correct if the following conditions hold.
If σ = s, h 1 , f = ASIGN(X i , X j , x i , f, M ), and S = σ, X i , X j , M , then AVERIFY(S)= accept. Moreover, if KGEN(k) = f for some k ∈ K, then VERIFY(k, S)= accept.
Unforgeability
We give a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a concurrent signature scheme under a chosen message attack in the multi-party setting. To do this, we extend the definition of existential unforgeability against a chosen message attack of [GMR88] to the multi-party setting. Our extension is similar to that of [B03] and is strong enough to capture an adversary who can simulate and observe concurrent signature protocol runs between any pair of participants. It is defined using the following game between an adversary E and a challenger C.
Setup: C runs SETUP for a given security parameter l to obtain descriptions of U, M, S, K, F, and KGEN : K → F. SETUP also outputs the public and private keys {X i } and {x i } and any additional public parameters π. E is given all the public parameters and the public keys {X i } of all participants. C retains the private keys {x i }. E can make the following types of query to the challenger C: KGen Queries: E can request that C select a keystone k ∈ K and return the keystone fix f = KGEN(k). If E wishes to choose his own keystone, then he can compute his own keystone fix using KGEN directly. KReveal Queries: E can request that C reveal the keystone k that it used to produce a keystone fix f ∈ F in a previous KGEN query. If f was not a previous KGEN output then C outputs invalid, otherwise C outputs k where f = KGEN(k). ASign Queries: E can request an ambiguous signature for any input of the form X i , X j , h 2 , M where h 2 ∈ F, X i and X j = X i are public keys and M ∈ M. C responds with an ambiguous signature σ = s, h 1 , h 2 = ASIGN(X i , X j , x i , h 2 , M ). Note that using ASign queries in conjunction with KGen queries, E can obtain concurrent signatures k, σ for messages and pairs of users of his choice. AVerify and Verify Queries: Answers to these queries are not provided by C since E can compute them for himself using the AVERIFY and VERIFY algorithms. Private Key Extract Queries: E can request the private key corresponding to the public key of any participant X i . In response C outputs x i . Output: Finally E outputs a tuple σ = s, h 1 , f where s ∈ S, h 1 , f ∈ F, along with public keys X c and X d , and a message M ∈ M. The adversary wins the game if AVERIFY( s, h 1 , f , X c , X d , M )= accept, and if either of the following two cases hold: 1. No ASign query with input either of the tuples X c , X d , f, M or X d , X c , h 1 , M was made by E, and no Private Key Extract query was made by E on either X c or X d . 2. No ASign query with input X c , X i , f, M was made by E for any X i = X c , X i ∈ U, no Private Key Extract query with input X c was made by E, and either f was a previous output from a KGen query or E produces a keystone k such that f = KGEN(k).
Definition 3. We say that a concurrent signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the multi-party model if the probability of success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible (as a function of the security parameter l).
Case 1 of the output conditions in the above game models forgery of an ambiguous signature in the situation where the adversary does not have knowledge of either of the respective private keys. This condition is required for our protocol so that the matching signer B is convinced that A's ambiguous signature can only originate from A. Case 2 models forgery in the situation where the adversary knows one of the private keys and so applies to the situation in our protocol where one of the two parties attempts to cheat the other. More specifically, it covers attacks where an initial signer forges a concurrent signature by a matching signer, and where a matching signer has access to an initial signer's ambiguous signature and keystone fix (but not the actual keystone) and forges a concurrent signature of the initial signer.
A further point to note is that in case 2, we insist that no ASign query of the form X c , X i , f, M is made, for any X i = X c , X i ∈ U. This is because, given a valid ambiguous signature σ = s, h 1 , f for public keys X c and X i , and the private keys of both X i and X d , it may be possible to create a valid ambiguous signature σ = s , h 1 , f with public keys X c and X d on a message M . This is certainly the case for our concrete scheme, but should not be considered as a useful forgery because an attacker does not succeed in changing who is actually bound by the signature: in this case X c .
Ambiguity
Ambiguity for a concurrent signature is defined by the following game between an adversary E and a challenger C.
Setup: This is as before in the game of Section 3.2. Phase 1: E makes a sequence of KGen, KReveal, ASign and Private Key Extract queries. These are answered by C as in the unforgeability game of Section 3.2. Challenge: Then E selects a challenge tuple X i , X j , M where X i and X j are public keys, and M ∈ M is the message to be signed. In response, C randomly selects k ∈ K and computes f = KGEN(k), then randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
and outputs σ 2 = s 2 , f, h 2 . Phase 2: E may make another sequence of queries as in Phase 1; these are handled by C as before. Output: Finally E outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1}. E wins if b = b and E has not made a KReveal query on any of the values f, h 1 or h 2 .
Definition 4. We say that a concurrent signature scheme is ambiguous if no polynomially bounded adversary has advantage that is non-negligibly greater than 1/2 of winning in the above game.
We note that ambiguity in our concrete concurrent signature scheme will come directly from the ambiguity property of an underlying ring signature scheme. However the definition for ambiguity (or anonymity) in two-party ring signatures [RST01, BSS02, ZK02] states that an unbounded adversary should have probability exactly 1/2 of guessing b correctly. Our definition must be slightly weaker because in our ambiguous signatures, one of our h values is generated by KGEN and is therefore at best pseudorandom. However, since we model KGEN by a random oracle when proving ambiguity for our concrete scheme, we achieve perfect ambiguity as in the stronger definition for ring signatures.
Fairness
We require the concurrent signature scheme and protocol to be fair for both an initial signer A, and a matching signer B. This concept is defined via the following game between an adversary E and a challenger C:
Setup: This is as before in the game of Section 3.2. KGen, KReveal, ASign and Private Key Extract Queries: These queries are answered by C as in the unforgeability game of Section 3.2. Output: Finally E chooses the challenge public keys X c and X d , outputs a keystone k ∈ K, and S = σ, X c , X d , M where σ = s, h 1 , f , s ∈ S, h 1 , f ∈ F, and M ∈ M, and where AVERIFY(S) = accept. The adversary wins the game if either of the following cases hold: 1. If f was a previous output from a KGen query, no KReveal query on input f was made, and if k, S is accepted by VERIFY. 2. If E also produces S = σ , X d , X c , M , with σ = s , h 1 , f , s ∈ S, h 1 , f ∈ F, message M ∈ M, where AVERIFY(S ) = accept, and k, S is accepted by VERIFY, but k, S is not accepted by VERIFY.
Definition 5. We say that a concurrent signature scheme is fair if a polynomially bounded adversary's probability of success in the above game is negligible.
Our definition of fairness formalizes our intuitive understanding of fairness for A in the protocol of Section 2.2 (in case 1 of the output conditions), since it guarantees that only the entity who generates a keystone can use it to create a binding signature (by revealing it). It also captures fairness for B (in case 2 of the output conditions), since it guarantees that any valid ambiguous signatures produced using the same keystone fix will all become binding. Thus B cannot be left in a position where a keystone binds his signature to him while A's initial signature is not also bound to A. However note that our definition does not guarantee that B will ever receive the necessary keystone.
Security
Definition 6. We say that a correct concurrent signature scheme is secure if it is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the multi-party setting, ambiguous, and fair.
We present a concrete concurrent signature scheme in which the underlying ambiguous signatures and the resulting concurrent signatures are obtained by modifying signatures in the basic scheme of Schnorr [S91] . The scheme's algorithms (SETUP, ASIGN, AVERIFY, VERIFY) are as follows:
SETUP: On input a security parameter l, two large primes p and q are selected such that q|p − 1. These are published along with an element g of (Z/pZ) * of order q, where q is exponential in l. The spaces S, F, M, K are defined as follows: S ≡ F=Z q and M ≡ K={0, 1} * . Two cryptographic hash functions H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z q are also selected and we define KGEN to be H 1 . Private keys x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n are chosen uniformly at random from Z q , where n is polynomial in l. The public keys are computed as X i = g xi mod p and are made public. ASIGN: This algorithm takes as input X i , X j , x i , h 2 , M , where X i , X j = X i are public keys, x i ∈ Z q is the private key corresponding to X i , h 2 ∈ F and M ∈ M is a message. The algorithm picks a random value t ∈ Z q and then computes the values:
Here "||" denotes concatenation. The algorithm outputs σ = s, h 1 , h 2 . AVERIFY: This algorithm takes as input σ, X i , X j , M where σ = s, h 1 , h 2 , s ∈ S, h 1 , h 2 ∈ F, X i and X j are public keys, and M ∈ M is a message. The algorithm checks that the equation
i X h2 j mod p ||M ) mod q holds, and if so, outputs accept. Otherwise, it outputs reject. VERIFY: This algorithm is defined in terms of KGEN and AVERIFY, as in Section 2.1.
The ASIGN algorithm is a direct modification of the ring signature algorithm of [AOS02] , and guarantees our property of ambiguity before the keystone is revealed. We require that X j = X i since otherwise the signature would be a standard Schnorr signature [S91] and would not be ambiguous. It is also easily checked that the scheme satisfies the definition of correctness and that AVERIFY has the required symmetry property.
A concrete concurrent signature protocol can be derived directly from the algorithms defined above and the generic protocol in Section 2.2.
Security of the Concrete Concurrent Signature Scheme
We now state some security results for the concrete scheme of Section 4. The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 3 are proved in Appendix A. The proof of Lemma 2 is routine, and the details are left to the reader. Our proofs of security are in the random oracle model [BR93] .
Lemma 1. The concurrent signature scheme of Section 4 is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
Lemma 2. The concurrent signature scheme of Section 4 is ambiguous in the random oracle model.
Lemma 3. The concurrent signature scheme of Section 4 is fair in the random oracle model. Theorem 1. The concurrent signature scheme of Section 4 is secure in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
Extensions and Open Problems
The Scheme Can Use a Variety of Keys
Our concurrent signature scheme can be based on any ring signature scheme, as long as it is compatible with the keystone fix idea. Thus it is feasible to build concrete concurrent signature schemes using a variety of key types, and therefore the security of such schemes may be based on a variety of underlying hard problems. Furthermore, the key pairs in a single concurrent signature scheme do not have to be of the same type. The techniques to be used for achieving concurrent signatures from a variety of keys are the same as the key separability techniques for ring signatures as described in [AOS02] .
The Multi-party Case
It would be interesting to see if concurrent signatures could be extended to the multi-party case, that is, where many entities can fairly exchange signatures concurrently. The existing two party scheme can trivially be extended to include multiple matching signers. However we do not as yet have a model for fairness for such a scheme. It would also be interesting to investigate methods whereby the revelation of keystones did not depend entirely on the initial signer, but on the other signing parties as well.
Conclusion
We introduced the notion of concurrent signatures, presented a concurrent signature scheme and related its security to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in an appropriate security model. We have also discussed some applications for concurrent signatures, and the advantages they have over previous work. In particular, we have compared concurrent signatures to techniques for fair exchange of signatures, and presented some applications in which the full security of fair exchange may not be necessary and the more pragmatic solution of concurrent signatures suffice.
